We analyze the empirical determinants of liquidity in debt markets in light of predictions stemming from debt-based information theories. We conduct a battery of tests confirming predictions of asymmetric information models of bond liquidity, including those that predict a"hockey-stick" relation between bond liquidity and underlying fundamental value. When debt is deep in the money, it becomes informationally insensitive and more liquid. In contrast, when firm value deteriorates towards the left tail, the value of debt becomes informationally sensitive and less liquid. We alleviate endogeneity concerns using exogenous variation in firm value that is plausibly not driven by bond liquidity.
Introduction
What determines liquidity in debt markets? Going back to seminal work by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) , a large theoretical literature emphasizes the role that information asymmetries play in determining liquidity in asset markets. If information asymmetries regarding asset payoffs are sufficiently severe, adverse selection will inhibit trade between buyers and sellers.
Beyond information asymmetries, other theories and frameworks have been proposed in understanding the determinants of liquidity in asset markets. These include limited risk bearing capacity among intermediaries, market maker inventory risk, search-based models, and models of heterogeneous beliefs.
1
A more recent theoretical literature applies insights from information economics to the question of liquidity in debt markets. Prominent examples include Dang et al. (2012 Dang et al. ( , 2013 and Holmström (2015) , which analyze how the information sensitivity of debt and the varying nature of this sensitivity affect liquidity and liquidity dry-ups in debt markets. In this paper, we empirically analyze the determinants of liquidity in debt markets in light of these debt-based information theories.
Before describing the empirical analysis, it is useful to review the intuition behind Dang et al. (2012) .
2 The main idea is that the well-known "hockey-stick" functional form of debt payoffs is key in understanding debt liquidity.
3 Because of this functional form, when debt is deep in the money -that is, when the distribution of underlying firm value is concentrated in the right tail, where the probability of default is low -debt becomes informationally insensitive. Regardless of the realization of underlying firm value, the market value of debt will be very close to its face value. Thus, even if parties may enjoy an informational advantage regarding underlying firm value, when debt is relatively deep in the money, this informational advantage will not translate into asymmetric information regarding debt value. Liquidity in this informationally insensitive region is predicted to be high.
Consider, then, what happens when firm value deteriorates toward the left tail, with a distribution that is centered closer to the "kink" of the hockey-stick-shaped payoff (that is, below which the firm defaults on maturity). In this region of payoffs, the value of debt becomes very sensitive to private information since below the default threshold debt payoffs move one for one with firm value. Trading parties therefore have strong incentives to develop and acquire information about underlying debt value. Information asymmetries will be relatively high in this informationally sensitive region. As debt values deteriorate and enter the informationally sensitive region, liquidity will thus fall. 4 Liquidity is thus endogenously affected by variation in underlying asset values.
5
Testing the mechanisms behind asymmetric-information theories of debt liquidity is difficult. For example, simply showing that bond liquidity declines as bond values deteriorate -in essence, regressing measures of bond liquidity on bond prices or credit spreads -suffers from a severe reverse causality endogeneity concern. Rather than deteriorations in bond value endogenously causing declines in liquidity, it could be that bond prices are deteriorating in response to exogenous changes in bond liquidity. Indeed, in analyzing the pricing implications of bond illiquidity a large literature regresses credit spreads on measures of liquidity -that is,. the exact opposite regression to that described above.
6
In this paper we analyze the determinants of debt liquidity along two avenues. First, we test a series of predictions derived from the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity in Dang et al. (2012) . These tests, in essence, present a series of empirical time-series and cross-sectional correlations in the data relating bond liquidity to observable bond and firm level characteristics. While in and of themselves, these empirical tests cannot rule out endogeneity concerns, taken together, they provide support to the single, parsimonious theory from which they are derived. In the second part of the paper, we alleviate endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variables (IV) approach (described below) to lend support for a causal relation between declines in bond values and diminished bond liquidity.
Our empirical analysis employs TRACE data on nonfinancial corporate bonds between July 2002 and December 2012, we employ three commonly used measures of bond liquidity:
the γ measure based on Bao et al. (2011) , the Amihud measure, and the Imputed Roundtrip Trades (IRT ) measure (Feldhütter 2012) . 7 We begin the analysis by confirming in our data that bond illiquidity rises as bond price declines. This well-known result is a basic prediction of the asymmetric information theory of bond illiquidity, and indeed of essentially all other theories of liquidity. 8 The economic effect is significant; a standard deviation fall in bond price, for example, is associated with increased illiquidity that ranges between 56.9 percent 4 Myers and Majluf (1984) employ a distinction of a similar flavor in their Pecking Order Theory of capital structure in which debt is shown to be less informationally sensitive than equity.
5 He and Milbradt (2014) provide a search-based model together with optimal firm default dynamics in which liquidity and default risk are endogenously determined. In their model, riskier bonds are more illiquid. Importantly, though, this result is driven by an exogenous assumption that bonds in default are illiquid -an assumption that can be justified using asymmetric-information primitives or, alternatively, an assumption regarding institutional differences regarding the market for defaulted bonds.
6 See e.g., Chen et al. (2007) , and Bao et al. (2011) . 7 All three measure il liquidity -that is, rises in the measure are associated with greater illiquidity. 8 For studies showing a negative relation between bond illiquidity and credit spreads, see, e.g., Chen et al. (2007) , Covitz and Downing (2007) , Bao et al. (2011), de Jong and Driessen (2012) , Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) . and 78.9 percent of the unconditional mean of γ. The negative relation is robust to the inclusion of industry, issuing firm, and bond fixed effects, as well as year-by-month fixed effects, with the latter implying that the negative relation between price and illiquidity is not solely due to the fall in bond prices and concurrent rise in illiquidity that occurred during the 2008-9 financial crisis.
We proceed by testing a series of predictions stemming from the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity in Dang et al. (2012) . First, we consider a more refined prediction of the theory -namely, that the hockey-stick relation in bond payoffs implies a nonlinear hockey-stick relation between bond illiquidity and bond price. This prediction is confirmed in the data: the negative relation between illiquidity and bond price exhibited in our baseline results is indeed highly nonlinear, exhibiting a hockey stick structure. In the lower deciles of bond price, illiquidity rises rapidly. We also confirm this hockey stick relation using credit ratings as well as Merton's Distance-to-default measure instead of bond prices.
Second, we show that when we control for current credit rating, bonds with a higher credit rating at issuance are more illiquid -consistent with a prediction of the asymmetricinformation theory of bond liquidity based on Hanson and Sunderam (2013) . According to this, bonds issued at a high rating do not develop a robust information-gathering infrastructure since market participants have little incentive to create one. As a consequence, when highly rated bonds become risky and enter the informationally sensitive region, the lack of information-gathering infrastructure increases adverse selection problems, thereby reducing liquidity. In contrast, bonds issued with a relatively low credit rating enjoy developed information-gathering environments, which diminish adverse selection and hence increase liquidity. Our results provide strong support for the Hanson and Sunderam (2013) hypothesis: when we hold constant the current credit rating of a bond, those bonds that declined from higher credit ratings exhibit lower liquidity. For example, bonds that deteriorate from a AA credit rating to a BB rating are less liquid than bonds that are issued at and remain with a BB rating.
Third, we show that, consistent with an asymmetric-information model, firms that are covered by more equity analysts have more liquid bonds and that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price is decreasing in the number of analysts covering the firm. As a fourth prediction, we examine how underlying collateral affects bond liquidity. Since collateral makes debt safer, expanding the range of the informationally insensitive region, theory predicts that secured bonds will be more liquid. This is precisely what the data show.
The fifth prediction we examine pertains to the effect of shifts in bond maturity on liquidity. The asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity predicts that the regime shift from the information-sensitive region to the information-insensitive region will be more pronounced in bonds with shorter maturity. In-the-money short-maturity bonds are extremely safe (indeed, are almost like money) and hence are predicted to be extremely liquid. As bond value deteriorates, the debt becomes informationally sensitive and illiquidity rises rapidly.
In contrast, in longer-maturity bonds this rise in illiquidity will be less pronounced since in-the-money long maturity bonds are riskier than their short-term equivalents and hence are less liquid. When the sample is segmented based on bond maturity, the data confirm this prediction. Bond illiquidity is more sensitive to reductions in bond price in shorter-maturity bonds. Further, the hockey-stick relation between illiquidity and bond price is far more pronounced in short-maturity bonds, precisely as predicted.
Sixth, we analyze the effect of changes in underlying equity volatility. The asymmetricinformation theory of bond liquidity predicts that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price will be greater for bonds issued by more volatile firms. Using measures of implied equity volatility calculated from OptionMetrics, we confirm this result: the hockey-stick relation between bond illiquidity and bond price is substantially more pronounced in bonds of high-(implied) volatility firms.
In the second part of the paper, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to test a causal relation between declines in bond values and diminished bond liquidity. To be valid, an instrument must shift bond values without directly affecting bond liquidity.
9 We use three instruments that plausibly satisfy this requirement: the cumulative return in the stock of the firm issuing the bond since the first date the bond is traded in our data, the cumulative return of the equal-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the issuing firm's industry since the first date the bond trades, and an instrument measuring large price changes in the equity of the firm issuing the bond. Instrumenting for bond prices using all three instrumentseffectively, movements in related equity returns -confirms the baseline finding that declines in bond price bring about increases in bond illiquidity. We confirm this result with a fourth instrumental variable -oil price movements -showing that oil price declines are associated with increases in illiquidity of bonds issued by oil and gas firms.
While the evidence presented herein supports the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity, there are clearly additional determinants affecting bond market liquidity. These include intermediary balance sheet strength, risk bearing capacity, and institutional differences across markets. 10 Still, our empirical analysis shows how informational asymmetries and 9 Somewhat less formally, what is required are variables that shift firm (and hence bond) value, due to a fundamental change in firm cash flow.
10 As one example, asymmetric information theories would find it difficult to explain differences in liquidity and credit spreads between on-and off-the run Treasuries (as in, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1991) or between Treasuries and Refcorp Bonds (as in Longstaff, 2014) . changes in the degrees of bond safety have an economically meaningful effect in explaining liquidity in a manner consistent with the predictions of Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2012) .
In addition, in robustness tests we show that our results continue to hold when focusing solely on investment grade bonds and when excluding the time-period of the 2008-09 financial crisis.
The results due not appear, therefore, to be driven by institutional constraints precluding certain market participants from holding non-investment grade bonds or by weak intermediary balance sheets during a financial crisis.
Our paper relates to the ideas behind the literature on the money premium associated with safe assets (see, e.g., Stein 2012; Gorton and Metrick 2012; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012; and Gorton 2016) . Due to their high liquidity and extremely safe nature, highly safe assets provide moneylike services, which are valued by household and institutional investors alike. The literature shows empirically that investors are willing to pay a substantial money premium for highly safe assets, particularly those with short-term maturities.
11 Underlying reasons for this money premium include, but are not limited to, costs incurred by households in understanding investments in risky assets (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012) , the use of safe assets as collateral in financial transactions (Gorton 2010) , and the use of Treasuries to back checkable deposits by commercial banks and money market funds (Bansal and Coleman 1996) . While US government liabilities are clear examples of safe assets that provide security of nominal repayment, the safe asset literature argues that certain relatively safe and liquid debt instruments issued by the private sector can substitute in part for public debt in providing moneylike services.
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As in the safe assets literature, we focus on the relation among liquidity, asset safety, and bond prices. However, while the safe assets literature seeks to explain how safety and high liquidity affect bond yields, we focus on the opposite direction of causality: namely, how do variation in bond values and the degree of bond safety affect bond liquidity? 13 We seek, therefore, to explain the determinants of bond liquidity rather than the pricing implications of this liquidity. Our empirical tests rely on predictions from the theory of adverse selection of Dang et al., which relates the relative safety of a bond to its degree of information sensitivity and hence its liquidity. We empirically examine the relation among liquidity, safety, and bond 11 For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) estimate a convenience premium on Treasuries of 73 bps. Greenwood et al. (2015) estimate a money premium of approximately 60 bps for one-week T-bills.
12 Indeed, much of this literature focuses on the incentive of private actors, particularly in the financial sector, to capture the money premium by issuing relatively safe, short-term liabilities (see, e.g., Stein 2012; Greenwood et al. 2015; Carlson et al. 2016; and Sunderam 2016) . Stein (2012) analyzes how such issuance may induce negative externalities with adverse affects on financial sector stability.
13 Put differently and somewhat informally: whereas the literature on the money premium places bond prices on the lefthand side of the regression analysis, relating it to the supply of liquid, highly safe assets (see, e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012 and Greenwood et al. 2015) , our analysis places liquidity on the left-hand side of the regression, relating it to plausible variation in the degree of bond safety.
values on a varying spectrum of the degree of bond riskiness, ranging from highly safe AAA bonds to bonds with very low credit ratings. Perhaps the closest paper to ours is Friewald et al. (2016) who develop and test a market-microstructure model of seniority and liquidity and show that more senior tranches of Asset-Backed Securities are indeed more liquid.
In addition, our paper is related to the large literature on the asset-pricing implications of liquidity, starting with Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and continuing with such studies as Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) , Heaton and Lucas (1996) , Vayanos and Vila (1999), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005) , Sadka (2006) , and Rocheteau (2010) .
This literature analyzes theoretically the premium that investors will pay for assets of greater liquidity and shows empirically that asset liquidity is indeed priced, with a sizable effect of liquidity on expected returns. Like the case of the safe assets literature, these studies focus on the pricing implications of liquidity rather than on the empirical determinants of liquidity, the focus of our study. One notable exception is Goldstein et al. (2007) , who use the introduction of TRACE as a natural experiment to study the effects of transparency on liquidity in the corporate bond market. Similarly, Hameed et al. (2010) use a model of capital constraints and show that negative market and firm returns decrease stock liquidity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the data sources and explains the construction of the variables used in the analysis. Section 2 explores the relation between bond prices and liquidity. Section 3 presents the analysis of the cross-sectional relation among bond characteristics, informational sensitivity, and liquidity. Section 4 presents the instrumental variables analysis. Section 5 concludes.
1 Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Construction of illiquidity measures
We use bond-pricing data from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's TRACE (Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine).
14 Our initial sample includes all corporate bonds traded in TRACE. Following Bao et al. (2011) , we keep bonds with a time-to-maturity of at least six months and standard coupon intervals (including zero-coupon bonds). We exclude bonds that are issued by financial firms, as well as convertible, putable, and fixed-price callable bonds.
We construct three measures of illiquidity. Our first measure, γ, has been proposed by Bao et al. (2011) , and is defined as the negative covariance of log-price changes in two consecutive periods:
Our second measure of illiquidity has been been suggested by Amihud (2002) . The Amihud measure captures the effect of trading volume on return and is constructed by first calculating a daily average price impact measure:
where N t is the number of trades in a day, r i is the return of trade i, and V olume i is the face value of trade i in millions of dollars. Next, we calculate a monthly Amihud measure by taking the median daily measure within a month.
Our third measure of illiquidity, the Implied Round-Trip Cost (IRT ), is calculated by first identifying all trades in a particular bond with identical trading volumes within a trading date. Next, we calculate the scaled difference between the highest and lowest prices of these trades:
where P max and P min are the highest and lowest prices paid for these same-volume transactions.
We calculate a monthly IRT measure by calculating the mean daily measure within a month.
Summary statistics
We supplement the data from TRACE with bond characteristics from Thomson Reuter's SDC Platinum and Mergent FISD. Next, we augment the data using firm characteristics 
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To further gauge the behavior of aggregate bond illiquidity over time, Table 2 
Bond Prices and Liquidity
According to Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2012) , shifts in underlying firm value impact liquidity in debt markets. As underlying value deteriorates, debt shifts from being informationally insensitive to informationally sensitive as asymmetric information between market participants and adverse selection problems rise. Declines in bond prices thus lead to rises in bond illiquidity.
16
15 For an in-depth analysis of credit markets' illiquidity during financial crises, see Benmelech and Bergman (2018) .
16 Information regarding underlying firm value is clearly also produced in equity markets as well. An implicit assumption, then, in asymmetric information theories of debt liquidity is that some form of market Testing this mechanism is an extremely difficult endeavor. Simply regressing bond illiquidity on bond prices raises a fundamental reverse causality concern. Rather than declines in bond values causing illiquidity to rise, it could be that bond prices are declining due to an expected subsequent reduction in bond liquidity. Another concern is omitted variables -that is, factors correlated with both with bond illiquidity and bond prices.
We proceed, therefore, along two avenues. The first is to test a series of predictions stemming directly from the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity in Dang et al. (2012) . Although the tests, in and of themselves, cannot rule out the endogeneity concerns above, taken together they lend support to the single, parsimonious theory from which they are derived.
17 In doing so, we emphasize that the evidence presented in support of the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity clearly does not rule out additional mechanisms affecting bond liquidity.
Our second avenue of research, presented below, is to alleviate endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. To be valid, an instrument must shift bond values without directly affecting bond liquidity. 18 We use three instruments that plausibly satisfy this requirement: (1) the cumulative return in the stock of the firm issuing the bond since the first date the bond is traded in TRACE; (2) the cumulative return of the equal-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the issuing firm's industry since the first date that the bond trades;
and (3) an instrument measuring large price changes in the equity of the firm issuing the bond. Instrumenting for bond prices using all three approaches -effectively, movements in related equity returns -verifies our baseline finding: declines in bond price bring about increases in bond illiquidity. We confirm this result using a fourth instrumental variable -oil price movements -showing that oil price declines are associated with increases in illiquidity of bonds issued by oil and gas companies.
We begin our analysis by testing a series of predictions on the relation between bond liquidity and bond price derived from the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity.
segmentation exists between equity and debt markets in that information between participants in the two markets does not flow seamlessly. Such segmentation can arise due to organizational constraints or constraints in the ability and willingness of participants in debt markets, such as insurance companies and pension funds, to analyze information on 'informationally-sensitive' assets. 17 Alternatively, the results presented in this section present empirical evidence with which alternative theories should be consistent 18 Somewhat less formally, what is required are variables that shift firm (and hence bond) value, due to a fundamental change in firm cash flow.
Baseline results
To document the empirical relation between bond illiquidity and prices, we estimate variants of the following baseline specification:
where Illiquidity is one of our three measures: γ, Amihud, and IRT , subscripts indicate bond (i) and month (t), P rice i,t−1 is bond price or the yield spread over a maturity-matched
Treasury lagged by one month, X i is a vector of bond characteristics that include the issue size and time since issuance, δ t is a vector of either year or year-by-month fixed effects, θ i is a vector of cross-sectional fixed effects -industry (three-digit SIC), firm, or bond fixed effects -and i,t is the regression residual. We report the results from estimating variants of regression ?? in Table 3 . Tables throughout this paper report regression coefficients and standard errors clustered at the bond level (in parentheses). Table 3 reports the coefficients from estimating regression ?? using the γ measure of illiquidity as the dependent variable. The main explanatory variable in the first six columns is the bond yield spread, and in Columns 7-12 it is price. As can be seen, the table confirms a well-known result in the literature on liquidity: bond illiquidity is negatively related to bond price (and positively related to bond yields).
Column 1, based on regression ?? and estimated with year and industry fixed effects, shows a positive association between illiquidity and yield spread. We obtain very similar results when we include year-by-month -instead of just year fixed effects -and industry fixed effects (Column 2). The year-by-month fixed effects imply that this relation is not driven simply by variation in risk-free rates over time, or variation in any other component of credit spreads common to all bonds in a given year-month. Similarly, these year-by-month fixed effects also imply that the relation presented here, as well as those described below, are not driven simply by the rise in illiquidity during the 2008-9 financial crisis.
Next, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that the results hold whether we include both firm and year fixed effects (Column 3) or firm and year-by-month fixed effects (Column 4).
Finally, in Columns 5 and 6 we control for time-invariant bond fixed effects -effectively identifying off of within-bond time-series variation in addition to year fixed effects (Column 5) and year-by-month fixed effects (Column 6). The positive association between γ and yield spread remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level when we control for bond fixed effects.
19 As our left-hand side measures are positively correlated with bond il liquidity, we refer throughout the paper to bond illiquidity rather than bond liquidity.
The economic effect of the yield spread on γ is sizable: a one standard deviation increase is associated with increased illiquidity between 56.9 percent and 78.9 percent of γ's unconditional mean. Moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile results in increased illiquidity that is between 15.5 percent and 21.5 percent of the unconditional mean.
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In Columns 7-12 of Table 3 we use bond price as our variable of interest in explaining γ. Column 7 is estimated with year and industry fixed effects. As can be seen, there is a negative correlation between illiquidity and bond price, implying that bonds with lower prices have a high γ measure of illiquidity. As in the first six columns, we obtain similar results when we include: year-by-month -instead of just year -and industry fixed effects (Column 8); both firm and year fixed effects (Column 9); firm and year-by-month fixed effects (Column 10); bond and year fixed effects (Column 11); and bond as well as year-by-month fixed effects (Column 12). Turning to the economic effect of bond prices on γ, moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile results in increased illiquidity that is between 54.2 percent and 83.4 percent of the unconditional mean of γ. We obtain similar results when we use the Amihud measure of illiquidity as the dependent variable and report the results in Table 4 .
In unreported results we repeat the analysis in Tables 3 and 4 using the IRT measure of illiquidity and find similar values.
Robustness Tests

Controlling for Volatility
One concern with the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 is that our findings are driven by volatility. For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) predict that market liquidity declines as volatility increases, especially when capital markets are distressed. Similarly, Stoll (1978) , Grossman and Miller (1988), and Vayanos (2004) show that volatility and liquidity are linked. Table 5 presents a correlation matrix between our three measures of illiquidity and two measures of volatility: (1) implied equity volatility -which we extract from the volatility surface files in OptionMetrics -calculated from option prices on the traded stock of the issuer of each bond; and (2) bond volatility defined as the standard deviation of daily bond returns in a given month.
21 As Table 5 illustrates, implied volatility is positively correlated with our three measures of illiquidity with a Pearson correlation coefficient that ranges from 0.157 to 0.293 (all statistically significant at the 1 percent level). While our measure of bond volatility is also correlated with the three measures of illiquidity -its correlations with the measures are much smaller, ranging from 0.015 to 0.026.
We reestimate regression ?? adding the two measures of volatility as explanatory variables and report the results in Table 6 . As Table 6 illustrates, implied volatility is positively correlated with bond illiquidity -while bond volatility is not significantly related to illiquidity.
The mean implied volatility in our sample is 0.305, and a one standard deviation increase in implied volatility results in increased illiquidity of 13.3 percent relative to the unconditional mean when we include year and firm fixed effects (Column 3). Importantly, the negative correlation between bond price and illiquidity remains significant while the magnitude of the effect of bond price on illiquidity is slightly lower -for example, with both firm and year fixed effects the coefficient changes from -0.093 to -0.081. In summary, our findings are robust to the inclusion of implied volatility and bond volatility and are unlikely driven by an omitted variable related to volatility.
Bond Illiquidity and the 2008-09 Financial Crisis
Another concern with our results is that they are driven by the financial crisis period of 2008-09. According to this, sharp bond price declines during the crisis may have forced institutional investors to sell off portions of their bond portfolios, thereby resulting in bond market illiquidity. We address this concern in the remaining columns of Table 6 . Column 7 of Table 6 presents results from reestimating regression ?? for the non-crisis years -i.e.,
we run the regression pooling together the 2002-07 and 2010-12 periods but excluding the 2008-09 period. As the table shows, the negative relation between γ and lagged price remains negative and significant at the one percent level. The magnitude of the effect of bond price on illiquidity is lower in non-crisis years -for example, with both bond and year-by-month fixed effects the coefficient changes from -0.112 to -0.077. Indeed, when we estimate regression ?? solely for the 2008-09 crisis period, the coefficient on γ jumps to -0.172. This increased sensitivity between illiquidity and bond price during the financial crisis is very much consistent with additional factors such as intermediary balance sheet strength, risk bearing capacity, and institutional constraints increasing in importance during the crisis. Nevertheless, as Table 6 demonstrates, the results continue to hold outside of the financial crisis as well.
Institutional Investors and Investment Grade Rating
An additional concern is that our results are driven by various market participants that are legally required to hold investment-grade bonds in their portfolios. Declines in bond prices, together with associated downgrades across the investment-grade threshold, may lead to bond illiquidity. We address this concern directly in the last two columns of Table 6 in which we estimate regression ?? separately for investment grade (Column 9) and non-investment grade bonds (Column 10). As can be seen, the negative relation between lagged price and illiquidity holds in both investment grade and non-investment grade bonds. 
Liquidity and bond prices: A "hockey-stick" relation
Beyond the negative relation between bond illiquidity and bond price, an important prediction of the informational theory of bond liquidity is that this relation exhibits a nonlinear hockeystick-like shape. Moving from high to low bond prices increases illiquidity, but the effect should be larger at lower bond prices. Indeed, at low bond prices, payoffs are concentrated within the "informationally sensitive" region of the concave payoff structure of bonds, implying high uncertainty and adverse-selection frictions that are predicted to increase bond illiquidity. In contrast, declines in bond values in the informationally insensitive region should be associated with relatively small increases in bond illiquidity.
To test the prediction of a nonlinear effect, we regress our measures of bond illiquidity on indicator variables for the 10 deciles of bond price. Specifically, we run the following regression:
where Illiquidity is one of three measures of bond illiquidity, γ, Amihud, or IRT , for bond i in month t. PriceDecile is a set of 10 indicator variables based on the (within-year) deciles of bond price -P riceDecile k i,t−1 equals one if bond i is in price decile k at month t − 1. 23 b i is a 22 We use the standard definition of investment grade which includes a bond rating of BBB-and above. Our results hold when we define investment grade as BBB+ and higher, or A-and higher.
23 Price decile 1 represents bonds with the lowest price.
vector of bond fixed effects, and c t is a vector of either year or year-by-month fixed effects.
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Standard errors are clustered at the bond level. The results are reported in Table 7 .
Similar to the results documented in Tables 3 and 4 , we find a negative relation between price and illiquidity across all three measures of bond liquidity. Importantly, the coefficients on the 10 price decile variables present a nonlinear relation between bond prices and illiquidity.
Focusing on Column 2, which employs γ as the dependent variable along with year-by-month fixed effects, we see that a rise from price decile 1 (the lowest decile in the regression) to price decile 2 reduces γ by 1.289 units (as compared to a sample mean of 1.533). In contrast, moving from price decile 9 to price decile 10 reduces γ measure by only 0.079 (=2.455-2.376).
As Table 7 demonstrates, the results using the other two measures of bond liquidity are similar (Columns 3-6). 
Liquidity and Distance to Default
Figure 3 provides an additional representation of the nonlinear hockey-stick behavior of bond illiquidity, using Merton's Distance-to-default -a structural measure for default risk based on the Merton model -as the left-hand side variable measuring the degree of bond distress. We construct the Distance-to-default measure following Campbell, Hilscher et al.(2008) , Bao, Chen, Hou, and Lu (2015) , and Bao and Hou (2017) . Figure 3 plots the coefficients on the resulting Distance-to-default bins. As in Figure 2 , the predicted nonlinear, hockey-stick relation between illiquidity and distance-to-default is readily observable in Figure 3 as. In this case, bonds in the two lowest Distance-to-default bins exhibit large increases in bond illiquidity.
Liquidity and credit ratings
Analyzing the relation between bond illiquidity and credit ratings is another way to view the nonlinear behavior of liquidity within the bond market. To analyze this relation we group credit ratings into seven categories, with Category 1 encompassing Moody's credit ratings between Aaa and Aa3 (inclusive), Category 2 encompassing ratings between A1 and A3, and so on. 27 We then regress the γ measure of bond illiquidity on indicator variables defined using the seven rating categories. Regressions include industry, firm, or bond fixed effects, as well as year or year-by-month fixed effects. The results are shown in Table 8 .
Consistent with higher uncertainty regarding underlying value, bond illiquidity decreases with credit rating. Importantly, similar to the results above, the relation exhibits a strong nonlinear effect, with illiquidity rising substantially in Categories 6 and 7. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the relation between bond rating and illiquidity, depicting the average illiquidity for each Moody's ratings category.
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Next, we examine a prediction of the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity based on Hanson and Sunderam (2013) . According to their model, market incentives to build an "information production infrastructure" when analyzing relatively safe debt securities will be weak because market participants will are likely obtain only a small informational advantage in trading such assets. As a consequence, when the default risk of highly rated bonds rises, the informational infrastructure meant to reduce asymmetric information is lacking, and further, because this infrastructure takes time to develop, trading in such debt instruments will suffer from adverse selection. In contrast, bonds issued with a low rating will enjoy a more developed information-gathering environment from the outset. Thus, based on Hanson and Sunderam (2013), a natural prediction of the information-asymmetry theory of bond liquidity is that, holding constant the current credit rating of a bond, those issued at a higher credit rating should be less liquid.
To test the prediction, we mark each bond's S&P credit rating at any point in time. 29 We then regress our illiquidity measures on the change in credit rating from the bond's previous rating to its current rating while controlling for current credit rating. We use the entire rating distribution for this test and assign a value of 1 to a rating of AAA, 2 to AA+, 3 to AA, and 27 Category 3 includes ratings between Baa1 and Baa3, Category 4 between Ba1 and Ba3, Category 5 between B1 and B3, Category 6 between Caa1 and Caa3, and Category 7 ratings Ca and C.
28 The figure is plotted by calculating sample means of the γ measure for each rating category. 29 We obtain the initial credit rating for each bond by matching TRACE data to SDC Platinum data.
so forth to the lowest rating category of D, which is assigned a value of 22. Specifically, we run the following regression:
Illiquidity i,t = β 0 + ζ × ∆Rating i,t−1 + ψT ime elapsed i,t−1 + χ∆Rating i,t−1 × T ime elapsed i,t−1
where ∆Rating is the bond-level difference between the previous credit rating and the current (lagged t−1) credit rating: ∆Credit Rating i,t−1 = Credit Rating i,t−1 −Credit Rating i,previous .
A positive ∆Rating implies that the bond has been downgraded in its last rating action. The regressions are run with current rating, bond, and year-by-month fixed effects.
The results are shown in Table 9 . As seen in Column 1, the coefficient on the change in credit rating is positive and significant. As predicted, controlling for current rating, if the drop from the previous rating to the current rating is larger, the bond is more illiquid. Consistent with incentives for"information production infrastructure" in Hanson and Sunderam (2013) , the trajectory of bond ratings is related to bond illiquidity, above and beyond the current rating. One concern with the results presented in Table 9 is that rating agencies may tend to smooth rating changes over time, leading to a "rating momentum" phenomenon in which a recent downgrade contains information on future expected downgrades (Lando and Skødeberg 2002). Such a momentum effect would imply that our results may be driven by expected future deterioration in credit quality rather than by information production. To alleviate the concern about rating momentum, we add lagged bond price to our regression. To the extent that rating agencies exhibit rating momentum bond market prices should reflect and adjust to such information. As Column 2 of Table 9 shows, after controlling for bond prices, the coefficient of ∆Credit Rating i,t−1 is still statistically significant at the 1 percent level, although its magnitude reduces from 0.237 to 0.106. Nevertheless, the economic magnitude of ∆Credit Rating i,t−1 is still sizable -holding constant current credit rating, a downgrade of three notches increases illiquidity by 0.318, representing an increase of 20.7 percent relative to the unconditional illiquidity mean. Column 3 adds the two measures of volatility used in Table 6 , in addition to the bond price, and the coefficient of ∆Credit Rating i,t−1 remains significant.
In Columns 4-6 we add to the change in bond credit rating, ∆Credit Rating, the time (in months) that elapsed since the previous rating, as well as the interaction between ∆Credit Rating and the time that elapsed since the rating change. We hypothesize that as time elapses, an informational infrastructure for downgraded bonds will be created, and thus illiquidity should decrease over time. As Columns 4-6 of Table 9 demonstrate, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term χ is negative, suggesting that, controlling for the current credit rating, the effect of a downgrade on illiquidity does indeed decay over time.
Liquidity and Analyst Coverage
We next turn to test the relation between informational infrastructure and bond illiquidity more directly using data on analyst coverage. We use the number of equity analysts covering the firm issuing the bond as a proxy for the degree of asymmetric information among bond market participants. 30 In particular, we hypothesize that when there are more equity analysts, more public information will be produced on the underlying firm value supporting the bond, which implies in turn that the bond should become more liquid. Implicit in the hypothesis relating analyst equity coverage to information asymmetries in bond markets are one of the following two assumptions: (1) equity and bond markets are not completely segmented in that at least some information produced by equity-analysts flows between the two markets; or (2) the degree of analyst equity coverage is positively correlated with the degree of information produced by participants in bond markets.
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Using analyst coverage as a proxy for information asymmetries, we test two predictions of the asymmetric-information theory of bond illiquidity. The first is simply that bond illiquidity should be negatively associated with analyst coverage. The second, more nuanced prediction is that decreases in the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price should be decreasing in the number of analysts covering the firm. With greater analyst coverage, bonds entering the informationally sensitive region of debt should have a smaller impact on bond illiquidity, as analysts' information production reduces market information asymmetries.
To test these two predictions, we regress the Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on indicator variables defined from five (equal-sized) quintiles of analysts' coverage as well as their interactions with lagged price:
30 The number of analysts is obtained from I/B/E/S. 31 Of course, we maintain the plausible assumption required in asymmetric-information theories of debt that information flows between debt and equity markets are not perfect: participants in debt markets cannot fully benefit from all information produced in equity markets.
where Illiquidity is the γ measure of bond illiquidity for bond i in month t, P rice i,t−1 is the one-month lagged bond price, and Analysts Coverage is a set of five indicator variables constructed from equal-sized quintiles of the number of analysts covering the bond. We report the results in Table 10 .
All regressions are run with time fixed effects (either year or year-by-month) as well as bond fixed effects. Bond fixed effects imply that identification is achieved from variation over time in the number of analysts covering the firm. This alleviates concerns that cross-sectional correlations between analyst coverage and various firm characteristics -such as firm sizeare driving the results.
As Table 10 shows, the two predictions are borne out in the data. First, the number of analysts covering the firm is negatively correlated with bond illiquidity. That is, consistent with an asymmetric-information theory of liquidity, bonds issued by firms with greater analysts coverage are more liquid. Further, we also find evidence supporting the second prediction that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price is decreasing in the number of analysts covering the firm. As the table illustrates, while lagged price is negatively related to bond illiquidity, the effect of lagged price on illiquidity is diminished for bonds with more analysts covering their firms. Indeed, based on the coefficient on the interaction term between the highest quintile of analyst coverage and bond price in Column 2 of the table (with bond and year-by-month fixed effects), the sensitivity of illiquidity to declines in bond prices is approximately 40 percent smaller among bonds in the highest quintile of analyst coverage as compared to bonds in the lowest quintile of analyst coverage. 
Collateral and liquidity
As another test of the asymmetric-information theory of liquidity, we examine the role played by collateral in determining bond liquidity. Controlling for the probability of default, theory predicts that collateral serves to increase liquidity because it supports bond payoffs in the event of default, making such payoffs less sensitive to private information regarding the distribution of firm cash flows. To test for this, we use SDC's security description to construct an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a bond is secured by collateral and zero otherwise. Although the SDC security description is lacking for many bonds, we are able to classify more than 600 secured and unsecured bonds that account for 20,474 bond-month observations. We then regress each of the three illiquidity measures on the secured bond indicator variable as well as on firm and year fixed effects and the seven credit 32 The coefficient on lagged bond price for Quintile 1 of analyst coverage (the omitted quintile) is -0.13, while the total differential on lagged bond price in Quintile 5 of analyst coverage is -0.08 = -0.13 + 0.05. rating indicator variables used in Table 9 . The results are presented in Table 11 . Consistent with the hypothesis, and similar to Friewald et al. (2016) we find that secured bonds are indeed more liquid than unsecured bonds, controlling for firm, year, and rating fixed effects.
The effect is economically significant: as shown in Column 1 of Table 11 , secured bonds have a Gamma illiquidity measure that is on average lower by 0.895 than that of unsecured bonds issued by the same firm. Bond collateral thus reduces illiquidity by 58.4 percent relative to the sample unconditional mean of 1.533.
Liquidity, bond prices, and bond maturity
In this section we analyze the relation between bond maturity and bond liquidity in light of the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity. We begin by confirming a basic result well known in the literature: longer-maturity bonds are more illiquid. Longer time to maturity should be associated in general with greater uncertainty over underlying value.
When trading such bonds, information-asymmetry and adverse selection problems should thus be greater, and hence illiquidity should be larger as well -Indeed, Bao et al. (2011) show that longer-term corporate bonds are more illiquid.
To analyze the relation between bond maturity and illiquidity, we regress the Gamma measure of bond liquidity on indicator variables defined from five (equal-sized) quintiles of bond maturity, running the following specification:
where Illiquidity is the γ measure of bond illiquidity for bond i in month t, and M aturityQuintile
is a set of five indicator variables based on quintiles of bond time to maturity -that is, The results are shown in Table 12 . Longer maturity bonds are indeed more illiquid, as theory predicts. This result holds across different fixed-effect specifications -industry, firm, and bond -with bonds in the fifth quintile of maturity exhibiting a γ measure of illiquidity that is higher by 1.46 on average than bonds in maturity quintile 1.
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We continue by examining a more specific prediction of the asymmetric-information view of bond liquidity. In particular, the theory predicts that the sensitivity of illiquidity to bond 33 Quintile 1 represents bonds with the shortest maturity. 34 This estimate is based on Column 6, which employs bond and year-by-month fixed effects.
price will be greater among shorter-maturity bonds as compared to bonds of longer maturity.
To see this, note first that when bonds are distressed, the value of the underlying asset -that is, the firm -is in the informationally sensitive region, and hence bond illiquidity should be high. This rise in illiquidity of distressed bonds should occur regardless of bond maturity. In contrast, theory predicts that the illiquidity of short-and long-maturity bonds will behave very differently when bond values are high and far from distress. Indeed, in short-maturity bonds, a high value of the underlying asset (that is, firm value) compared to the level of debt outstanding implies that the probability that the bond will become distressed -that is, enter the informationally sensitive region where illiquidity is high -is relatively small. Thus, short-maturity bonds far from distress should be very liquid.
In contrast, in longer-maturity bonds, even if firm value is high compared to debt level, a longer maturity implies a significantly probability that adverse shocks will push the bond into the distressed, informationally sensitive region. Thus, longer-maturity bonds should be relatively illiquid even when bond prices are high. Since both short-and long-maturity bonds are predicted to be illiquid when bond values are low, the end prediction, therefore, is that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price should be lower among longer-maturity bonds.
To test this prediction, we rerun regression ?? separately for each of the five maturity quintiles. All regressions focus on the γ illiquidity measure and employ bond and yearby-month fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the bond level. Consistent with the prediction, Table 13 shows that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to price is indeed smaller in longer-maturity bonds. For example, within the shortest-maturity quintile, moving from the lowest to the highest price decile increases the γ by 3.013. In contrast, within the longest-maturity quintile, the same change results in an increase of 1.785 in the γ illiquidity measure. Figure 5 presents the relation between bond illiquidity and price by maturity quintile.
To construct the figure, we rerun regression ?? for each of the five maturity quintiles using indicator variables constructed from 20 equal-sized bins of bond price (with bond and yearby-month fixed effects). The coefficients are plotted on the 20 price-bin indicator variables.
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As can be seen, the figure is highly consistent with the predictions of the asymmetricinformation theory of bond liquidity. In both short-and long-maturity bonds, illiquidity is high among the low bond-price deciles. In contrast, in short-maturity bonds, high deciles of bond price are extremely liquid, consistent with the low probability that these bonds will 35 The figure plots the average effect for each price bin using the average of the coefficients of the year-bymonth fixed effects. Put differently, for each price bin we add the coefficient on the price-bin indicator to the average coefficient on the temporal fixed effects.
enter distress before maturity. High deciles of bond price in long-maturity bonds are far more illiquid, consistent with the greater likelihood that these bonds will enter the informationally sensitive region before maturity.
3.7 Liquidity, bond prices, and equity volatility As discussed above, and confirmed in Table 6 , bond illiquidity increases with the volatility of the issuing firm's equity. This well-known result is, of course, consistent with the asymmetricinformation theory of bond liquidity: all else equal, increased volatility raises the probability that the bond will become distressed, with payoffs falling within the informationally sensitive region. Bond illiquidity should thus be higher when equity volatility rises.
A second, more specific, prediction of the asymmetric-information theory of bond illiquidity is that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price should be decreasing in the issuing firm's equity volatility. To see this, it is useful to consider the extreme case where equity volatility is near zero, so that there is little uncertainty in the underlying asset. When this is the case, even when the bond is distressed and the likelihood of default is high, there will be no asymmetric information regarding the underlying value of the bond: the volatility of the underlying asset is extremely low, and hence there should be little uncertainty regarding the bond's true value. Put differently, even when bond prices drop into the distressed region where bond payoffs depend on the value of the underlying asset, both buyer and seller are relatively certain of the value of the bond because underlying uncertainty is low. In contrast, when equity volatility is relatively high, liquidity is predicted to depend greatly on whether the bond is in the informationally sensitive or insensitive regions. Indeed, as the bond price rises and the value of the firm enters the informationally insensitive region, liquidity is predicted to rise since bond payoffs will not be very sensitive to the realization of the underlying value of the firm.
To test the prediction that illiquidity is less sensitive to bond price when underlying uncertainty is low, we regress γ on the interaction between the bond-price level and equity implied volatility. Specifically, we run the following regression: (9) where Illiquidity is the γ measure of bond illiquidity for bond i in month t, P rice i,t−1 is the one-month lagged bond price, and Implied V ol Quintile is a set of five indicator variables constructed from equal-sized quintiles of implied equity volatility -that is, Implied V ol Quintile k i.t equals one if bond i is in implied volatility quintile k at month t − 1.
The results are shown in Table 14 . First, consistent with the results in Table 6 , we find that illiquidity rises with underlying equity volatility. Second, consistent with our results throughout, illiquidity declines with bond price. Importantly, and consistent with the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity, the table shows that the sensitivity of bond illiquidity to bond price increases with underlying equity volatility. Inspecting the interaction coefficients in Table 14 shows that the sensitivity of γ to bond price in the highest implied equity volatility quintile is 2.7 times larger than the sensitivity of γ to bond price in the lowest equity volatility quintile.
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Figure 6 provides a graphic representation of this result. To construct the figure, we run regression ?? -the baseline regression relating γ to ten indicator variables constructed from the ten deciles of bond price -on three separate subsamples of the data: (1) bonds in the lowest decile of equity implied volatility; (2) bonds in decile 5 of equity implied volatility; and (3) bonds in the highest decile of equity implied volatility.
37 The coefficients on the price deciles are then plotted for each of the three regressions. The results are consistent with the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity. Among bonds in the lowest decile of equity volatility, bond illiquidity is low and insensitive to bond price. As described above, with little underlying volatility, uncertainty and asymmetric information are low regardless of the bond price level. As compared to decile 1, bonds in decile 5 of implied equity volatility exhibit higher illiquidity as well as a higher sensitivity of illiquidity to bond price. Finally, among bonds in the highest decile of implied equity volatility, bond illiquidity is both high and extremely sensitive to bond price. Indeed, as predicted, the hockey-stick relation between illiquidity and bond price is most pronounced for bonds in this decile, with illiquidity rising substantially in the lowest three deciles of bond prices.
36 Focusing on Column 6, which includes bond and year-by-month fixed effects, the coefficient on bond price is -0.054 for the lowest equity implied volatility quintile, whereas it is -0.1456 for bonds in the highest quintile of equity-implied volatility.
37 All regressions include bond and year-by-month fixed effects.
Instrumental Variables Regressions of Liquidity on Prices
In this section, we employ an instrumental variable approach to analyze the relation between bond prices and bond liquidity. Whereas prior literature analyzing the asset pricing implications of liquidity regresses yield spreads on bond liquidity, our focus is on the determinants of bond liquidity and, in particular, how underlying bond values affect bond liquidity.
Hence, the regressions we analyze take the exact opposite form to those employed in the asset-pricing literature: bond liquidity is the dependent variable and bond prices or yields are the explanatory variable. The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 and the additional tests in Tables 7-14 present a strong negative correlation between illiquidity and bond prices in line with the asymmetric information theory of bond liquidity. Still the estimates are subject to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. Rather than declines in bond values causing illiquidity to rise, it could be that bond prices are declining due to an expected (future) reduction in bond liquidity. While throughout the paper we estimate variants of regression ??
using lagged values of yield spreads and bond prices, it is of course still possible that lagged bond prices contain information on future liquidity, thereby maintaining the reverse causality concern. We thus address the reverse causality concern through an instrumental variables (IV) approach.
Cumulative stock and industry returns
We start by using the return on the equity of the firm that issued the bond as an instrument for its bond price. We argue that the return of the firm's stock is unlikely to be driven by concurrent bond liquidity and is thus not subject to the reverse causality concern. Theoretically, the sign of the correlation between the firm's stock and bond returns is ambiguous. On one hand, the value of the firm's assets affects the value of the firm's bonds and stocks in the same direction, resulting in a positive relation between stock returns and bond prices. On the other hand, the variance of the firm's assets leads to opposite effects on the value of firm debt and equity. The empirical evidence suggests that the first effect -which predicts a positive correlation between stock returns and bond prices -dominates the second, variance-based effect. For example, Kwan (1996) regresses weekly changes in individual bond yields on the issuing firm's lagged stock returns and finds that bond returns are significantly and negatively correlated with lagged stock returns -implying a positive correlation between lagged stock returns and bond prices.
Before running two-stage regressions, we begin by estimating the following reduced form specification:
where Illiquidity is the γ measure, subscripts indicate bond (i) and month (t), Cret i,t−1 is the lagged cumulative return on the stock of the issuing firm since the first date that the bond is traded in TRACE, X i is a vector of bond characteristics that includes the bond's issue size and time since issuance, δ t is a vector of either year or year-by-month fixed effects, θ i is a vector of cross-sectional fixed effects -either firm or bond fixed effects -and i,t is the regression residual. We report the results from estimating variants of regression ?? in Table   15 . We define Cret i,t−1 as a cumulative return variable so as to: (1) enable identification off of large changes in stock prices that may shift bond values across the informationally sensitive and insensitive regions; and (2) avoid a weak instruments problem. We also use large lagged monthly returns as an instrument in the next subsection.
As the first column of Table 15 illustrates, cumulative stock returns have a statistically significant negative effect on γ, implying that higher stock returns lead to higher bond liquidity (i.e., lower γ). The estimate of β 1 is -0.281 (Column 1 with bond and year-by-month fixed effects) and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. As stock returns and bond prices are positively related in the data (Kwan 1996) , the reduced form result supports the hypothesized mechanism: higher stock returns are associated with higher bond prices, which in turn leads to higher bond liquidity.
In Column 2 of Table 15 we use a different instrument, defined as Industry Cret i,t−1 , the lagged cumulative return on an equal-weighted portfolio of all the stocks in the issuing firm's industry since the first date that the bond is traded in TRACE. 38 The underlying idea in this industry-based instrument is that lagged stock returns on other firms within the same industry contain important information for the determination of a given firm's underlying value but are unlikely to be affected by the expected bond liquidity of that firm. We run the same reduced form specification above, using industry, rather than firm, cumulative stock return. The results in Column 2 are similar to those in Column 1: cumulative industry returns have a significant negative effect on the bond's γ measure of illiquidity.
In the last three columns of Table 15 , we estimate IV regressions via two-stage least squares (2SLS):
and
Regression ??, with P rice i,t−1 as the dependent variable, is the first stage in the estimation, and it includes an instrument (Z) that is excluded from the illiquidity regression (??).
Column 3 of Table 15 presents estimates of the second-stage regression (??) using the lagged cumulative return on the stock of the issuing firm, Cret i,t−1 , as the instrument. The model includes bond and year-by-month fixed effects. Column 4 of Table 15 presents estimates of (??) using the lagged cumulative return on an equal-weighted portfolio of all the stocks in the issuing firm's industry -Industry Cret i,t−1 -with the same fixed-effects specifications as in Column 3.
The 2SLS estimates of the effect of the bond price on γ is -0.133 when using the firm's own stock return as an instrument (Column 3) and is -0.167 when using industry returns as an instrument (Column 4), respectively. Thus, the instruments uncover a negative relation between bond liquidity and bond prices, which are larger than those documented in Table   3 . We obtain similar results using the two other measures of illiquidity, Amihud and IRT , which we omit here for brevity.
In the last column of Table 15 we employ the same 2SLS identification strategy using a variant of the industry return instrument used in Column 4 of the Table. In particular,
for each bond-month in the sample we calculate the lagged cumulative return on an equalweighted portfolio of stocks in the issuing firm's industry since the first date the bond is traded in TRACE, using only financially strong firms within the industry. Financially strong firms are calculated as those with a ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to interest expense in the top of their respective industry quartile.
The strong-firm industry instrument is meant to alleviate concerns that variation in returns of financially weak firms could be driven, in part, by changes in expected market liquidity, due for example to increased informational frictions in such firms. Put differently, equity movements in strong firms are plausibly less likely driven by changes in expected future liquidity movements, and more likely driven by changes to "market fundamentals." As can be seen from the last column of Table 15 , using the strong-firm industry cumulative return variable to instrument for bond prices, we find a negative and statistically significant relation between bond illiquidity and bond price.
Large drops in stock returns
The results presented in Table 15 are based on firm-or industry-level cumulative stock returns. We supplement the cumulative returns analysis in Table 15 with IV regressions that are based on large lagged monthly stock returns as an instrument. For every bond-month in our sample we calculate the one-month lagged return on the stock of the issuing firm. We then define two dummy variables that equal one if the return on the stock in the previous month is less or equal to the 10th or 25th percentile, respectively, of the stock's return distribution during our sample period. Table 16 presents the summary statistics of lagged monthly stock returns that are at or below the 25th percentile (first row), above the 25th percentile (second row), at or below the 10th percentile (third row), and above the 10th percentile (fourth row). The 10th and 25th percentile-based dummies capture significant declines in one-month lagged stock returns with mean monthly returns of -0.145 and -0.099, respectively. These lagged large movements in stock returns are unlikely to be driven by anticipation of declining liquidity of the bonds issued by the same firm, and thus these large stock price declines dummies are valid instruments for P rice i,t−1 in equation ??. We report the results of the second-stage regression (??) using large stock price declines dummies as the instruments in Table 17 . The first two columns of the table use the 25th percentile dummy as the instrument, while Columns 3 and 4 are estimated with the 10th percentile instrument.
As Table 17 shows, and consistent with the findings in Tables 3, 4 , and 15, large declines in stock prices are associated with shrinking liquidity of the bonds issued by the same firms.
Oil Prices
As our final empirical identification strategy, we estimate the effect of oil price shocks on the liquidity of bonds issued by oil and gas firms. We restrict our issuing firms to seven industries: Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas (SIC code 1311), Drilling Oil and Gas Wells (SIC code 1381), Oil and Gas Field Exploration Services (SIC codes 1382 and 1389), Petroleum
Refining (2911), Miscellaneous Products of Petroleum and Coal (SIC code 2990), and Oil and Gas Field Machinery and Equipment (SIC code 3533). We also extend our sample period up to 2015 to cover the large decline in oil prices in 2014 and 2015. Oil prices directly affect the prices of oil and gas bonds, which in 2015 accounted for about 15 percent of high-yield bonds in the US bond market. The final sample size of oil and gas bonds for which we are able to calculate illiquidity measures ranges from 19,142 to 29,452 bond-year observations depending on the measure of illiquidity we use in the analysis. We present reduced form estimates of the effect of monthly oil prices on all three measures of illiquidity in Table 18 .
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In Columns 1, 3, and 5 we regress each of the three measures of bond illiquidity on the natural log of monthly oil prices as well as bond and year fixed effects. As the table demonstrates, oil prices have a negative effect on illiquidity: higher oil prices make bonds more liquid. Although we cannot include year-by-month fixed effects, given that the underlying variation in oil prices is at the same level, the results are robust to the inclusion of bond and year fixed effects. We next add the issuing firm lagged leverage ratio and an interaction term between lagged leverage and log oil price. Oil and gas companies with higher financial leverage are more likely to be sensitive to oil prices as the exogenous price shock is amplified by their firm specific financial risk. As Columns 2, 4 and 6 demonstrate, that is exactly the case. Bonds of firms with higher leverage are less liquid and as the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term shows -leverage amplifies the effect of oil prices on bond illiquidity.
Conclusion
We test several predictions of asymmetric-information-based models of bond liquidity. We show that bond illiquidity rises as bond price declines using both OLS and IV regression models.
We conduct a series of empirical cross-sectional tests that pertain to predictions stemming from the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity of Dang et al. (2012) . Our results are consistent with the model. Bond liquidity is determined by the informational sensitivity structure of debt contracts. When debt is deep in the money it becomes informationally insensitive; regardless of the realization of underlying firm value, the market value of debt will be very close to its face value. Even if parties may enjoy an informational advantage regarding underlying firm value, this informational advantage will not translate into asymmetric information regarding debt value: liquidity in this informationally insensitive region is predicted to be high. Our results shed new empirical light on the informational nature of "safe assets" and the determinants of their informational sensitivity and liquidity.
39 For monthly oil prices we use the end-of-the month price per barrel of Europe Brent Spot Price FOB.
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(8) This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on either the lagged credit spread (Columns 1-6) or lagged bond price (Columns 7-12), as well as a vector of bond characteristics that includes the issue size and time since issuance. Depending on the specification, we include industry, firm, bond, year. and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the three measures of bond illiquidity on 10 indicator variables that are based on bond price deciles, as well as a vector of bond characteristics that includes the issue size and time since issuance. Depending on the specification, we include bond, year, and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Depending on the specification, we include industry, firm, bond, year, and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on ∆Credit Rating -the bond-level difference between the previous and the current credit rating, the time (in months) that elapsed since the previous rating action, the interaction between ∆Credit Rating and the time that elapsed since the last credit rating action, as well as seven indicator variables that are based on bond Moody's credit ratings, where Category 1 corresponds to the highest ratings and Category 7 corresponds to the lowest ratings, lagged bond price, lagged implied volatility, lagged bond volatility, and a vector of bond characteristics that includes the issue size and time since issuance. All specifications include bond and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on a indicator variables defined from five equal-sized quintiles of bond maturity, and a vector of bond characteristics that includes the issue size and time since issuance. Specifications include industry, firm, bond, year, and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on 10 indicator variables that are based on bond price deciles, as well as a vector of bond characteristics that includes the issue size and time since issuance. We run the regressions separately for each of the five maturity quintiles. Column 1 reports results for bonds in Quintile 1 (short) and Column 5 reports results for bonds in Quintile 5 (long). All specification include bond and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on lagged bond price, indicators variables defined from five quintiles of implied volatility, as well as the interactions between the implied volatility quintiles and lagged price and a vector of bond characteristics that includes the issue size and time since issuance. Specifications include firm, bond, and either year or year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on instrumental variables for bond prices. The instruments we use are: cumulative stock return (Columns 1 and 3); cumulative industry return (Columns 2 and 4); and 'strong' industry returns (Column 5). The regressions are estimated with either OLS (Columns 1 and 2) or 2SLS (Columns 3-5). All specification include bond and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the Gamma measure of bond illiquidity on instrumental variables for bond prices. The instruments we use are: large stock returns declines that are below the 25th percentile of the monthly stock return distribution (Columns 1 and 2) or below the 10th percentile of the monthly stock return distribution (Columns 3 and 4). The regressions are estimated using 2SLS and specification include bond and either year or year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from a regression of the three measures of bond illiquidity on log oil price, firm leverage, and an interaction between log oil price and leverage. The regressions are estimated for bonds issued by oil and gas companies. All specifications include bond and year-by-month fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by bond: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
